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Abstract
Hendra virus is a recently emerged zoonotic agent in Australia. Since first described in 1994, the virus has spilled from its
wildlife reservoir (pteropid fruit bats, or ‘flying foxes’) on multiple occasions causing equine and human fatalities. We
undertook a three-year longitudinal study to detect virus in the urine of free-living flying foxes (a putative route of
excretion) to investigate Hendra virus infection dynamics. Pooled urine samples collected off plastic sheets placed beneath
roosting flying foxes were screened for Hendra virus genome by quantitative RT-PCR, using a set of primers and probe
derived from the matrix protein gene. A total of 1672 pooled urine samples from 67 sampling events was collected and
tested between 1 July 2008 and 30 June 2011, with 25% of sampling events and 2.5% of urine samples yielding detections.
The proportion of positive samples was statistically associated with year and location. The findings indicate that Hendra
virus excretion occurs periodically rather than continuously, and in geographically disparate flying fox populations in the
state of Queensland. The lack of any detection in the Northern Territory suggests prevalence may vary across the range of
flying foxes in Australia. Finally, our findings suggest that flying foxes can excrete virus at any time of year, and that the
apparent seasonal clustering of Hendra virus incidents in horses and associated humans (70% have occurred June to
October) reflects factors other than the presence of virus. Identification of these factors will strengthen risk minimization
strategies for horses and ultimately humans.
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Introduction
Hendra virus is a sporadic, but highly lethal, recently emerged
zoonotic agent in Australia. Case fatality rate in humans is 60%,
and in horses, 75%. Since 1994, when it was first described, this
novel member of the family Paramyxoviridae has spilled from its
wildlife reservoir on 14 identified occasions (Figure 1), resulting in
45 attributed equine cases and 7 human cases [1,2]. Fruit bats of
the genus Pteropus (family Pteropodidae), colloquially known as flying
foxes, are the natural host of the virus, and are asymptomatically
infected [3]. Sero-epidemiologic studies have demonstrated
evidence of infection in all four Pteropus species occurring on
mainland Australia (P. alecto, P. conspicillatus, P. poliocephalus, P.
scapulatus), and across their geographic range [3,4]. However,
difficulty in detecting virus (cf. antibodies) in flying foxes has
previously limited understanding of infection prevalence and
infection dynamics in the natural host, and constrained spillover
risk management.
We undertook a three-year longitudinal study that used a
quantitative RT-PCR assay to detect Hendra virus genome in
pooled urine samples collected under flying fox roosts. The
objectives of the study were two-fold: to investigate infection
occurrence and frequency in flying fox populations, and to
investigate the genetic diversity of Hendra viruses in flying fox
populations. In this paper, we describe the former.
Methods
Ethics statement
Fieldwork was conducted under Department of Employment,
Economic Development and Innovation Animal Ethics Commit-
tee permit SA 2008/10/270, Queensland Department of
Environment and Resource Management Scientific Purposes
permit WISP05810609, and the Northern Territory Parks and
Wildlife Commission permit 37243.
Field methods
Flying fox colonies rather than individual flying foxes were
targeted. Multiple roost sites were identified in three geographi-
cally disparate sampling locations (.1500 km apart) in south-east
Queensland (SEQ), far north Queensland (FNQ) and in the
Northern Territory (NT) (Figure 1). Sampled roost sites included
Canungra, Cedar Grove, Esk, Slacks Creek, Regents Park and
Woodend (SEQ), Gordonvale, Lakeside, Mareeba, Thursday
Island and Tolga Scrub (FNQ), and Howard Springs, Mataranka,
Pine Creek, Katherine Gorge, Tindal RAAF Base and Wangi Falls
(NT). Sampling locations were visited every 4–8 weeks (a sampling
event) where possible, and an occupied roost site purposively
selected. In the late afternoon, at the selected roost, plastic sheeting
(typically measuring 3 m.62 m.) was placed under trees in which
flying foxes were roosting. The following morning at sunrise,
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micropipette (Soccorex
TM)a n d1 m lf i l t e rt i p( N e p t u n e
TM),
placed in a graduated 2 ml tube (Sarstedt microtube
TM) and held
on wet ice. The target sample number and volume was 3062m l
samples (typically, three pooled samples from each of ten plastic sheets).
Depending on roosting density, each sheet could hold urine from an
estimated 5–20 individuals, giving a sample size of 50–200 individuals
from ten sheets, and a minimum detectible infection prevalence of
between 1.5 and 6% (with 95% statistical confidence).
After all samples were collected, 560 ul of urine was taken by
graduated micropipette from each sample and added to an
equal volume of lysis buffer (Buffer AVL from QIAGEN Viral
RNA minikit
TM)i nas e c o n d2m lt u b e ,t oi n a c t i v a t ev i r u s
particles and preserve RNA. Then 500 ul of virus transport
media (VTM) was added to the balance of the sample in the
original tube. Samples were kept on wet ice or refrigerated until
they could be packed and shipped on dry ice (according to
IATA requirements, and typically within 48 hrs) to the
Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services (QHFSS)
laboratory (prior to March 2009) or the Biosecurity Sciences
Laboratory (BSL) in Brisbane. At QHFSS/BSL, the samples
were held in the PC3 (physical containment level 3) laboratory,
the lysis buffer samples at 4uC pending RNA extraction and
PCR analysis, and the VTM samples in a biosafety container at
280uC pending PCR results.
Laboratory methods
At QHFSS/BSL, viral RNA was extracted using a QIAGEN
viral RNA minikit
TM and following a modified ‘large volume’
protocol [5] (Smith, C. et al, unpublished). The extracted eluate
was screened for Hendra virus RNA by TaqMan
TM RT-PCR
using a set of primers and probe derived from the matrix protein
gene of Hendra virus [6]. Eluates testing positive on the
TaqMan
TM assay, plus the corresponding VTM aliquot, were
forwarded to the CSIRO Australian Animal Health Laboratory
(AAHL) in Geelong, Australia for cell culture and virus isolation
under PC4 conditions.
Data management and analysis
Data were stored and managed in a Microsoft Office Access
TM
database. Analyses were performed on extracted data exported to
a Microsoft Office Excel
TM spreadsheet. P values of the chi square
statistic are used to examine statistical association at the 95%
confidence level. Where the nature of the data precludes the use of
Figure 1. Map of Australia with flying fox distribution, Hendra virus spillover locations and flying fox sampling locations. Sampled
roost sites were identified in three geographically disparate sampling locations: south-east Queensland (SEQ), far north Queensland (FNQ) and the
Northern Territory (NT). The SEQ sampling location includes the sampled roost sites and spillover locations from Murwillimbah to Tewantin; the FNQ
sampling location includes sampled roost sites and spillover locations from Gordonvale to Clifton Beach, and north to the tip of Queensland; the NT
sampling location includes sampled roost sites identified in the Northern Territory, remote from any spillover locations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028678.g001
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Table S1 presents details of all sampling events over the three
year study period. A total of 1672 pooled urine samples from 67
sampling events was collected and tested between 1 July 2008 and
30 June 2011. Numbers varied with year and location, with 311
samples (19 sampling events) in year one, 465 samples (16
sampling events) in year two, and 896 samples (32 sampling events)
in year three. There were 1138 samples (47 sampling events) from
SEQ, 320 samples (12 sampling events) from FNQ and 214
samples (8 sampling events) from NT. Of the 67 sampling events, 8
were ‘follow-up’ events, prompted by previous detections, and are
excluded from ‘prevalence’ analyses because these data are not
independent (Table S1 and Table 1).
Table1 presents details of all sampling events yielding positive
urine samples. Figure 1 illustrates the geographic distribution of
the four species of flying fox occurring on mainland Australia, the
locations and dates of the 14 identified spillover events to horses,
and the flying fox sampling locations and sampled roost sites.
Over the three-year study period, 25% (15/59) of sampling
events yielded detections. There was no statistically significant
association with year or location, the proportion of detections
being 15.8% (3/19) in year one, 42.9% (6/14) in year two, and
23% (6/26) in year three (p=0.20), and 26% (10/39) in SEQ,
41.7% (5/12) in FNQ, and 0% (0/8) in NT (p=0.11). Table 2
presents a collapsed within-year summary of sampling events by
month, and shows that positive sampling events occurred in all
months except April (0/8) and December (0/4); the overlapping
95% confidence intervals suggest no statistically significant
difference between months.
Of the 1460 pooled urine samples collected within the 59
sampling events, 2.5% (36/1460) yielded detections. The propor-
tion of positive samples was statistically associated with both year
and location, being 1.6% (5/311) in year one, 5% (21/416) in year
two, and 1.4% (10/733) in year three (p=0.0003), and 2.7% (25/
926) in SEQ, 3.44% (11/320) in FNQ, and 0% (0/214) in NT
(p=0.03). In the collapsed within-year analysis (Table 2), the non-
overlapping 95% confidence intervals indicate that the proportion
of positive samples is statistically significantly higher in September
(33.3%, 95% CI 18.6–51%) than in January, February, March,
August and October.
Infection was detected in mixed species roosts (P. alecto and P.
polioceplalus; P. alecto and P. scapulatus; P. conspicillatus and P.
scapulatus; P. alecto, P. polioceplalus and P. scapulatus) and single
species roosts (P. alecto, P. conspicillatus) (Table 1).
Discussion
While serologic surveys have provided evidence of previous
Hendra virus infection in Australian flying fox populations,
successful attempts to demonstrate current infection have been
limited [7]. For this study, we implemented a sampling and testing
protocol that sought to maximize the likelihood of detection if
infection was present. Firstly, we collected pooled urine samples
from under flying fox colonies, as had Chua, 2003 [8], rather than
catching and sampling individual animals, so each sample
potentially represented multiple individuals. Flying foxes forage
Table 1. Details of 20 sampling events











Jul 08 to Jun 09 20-Nov FNQ Gordonvale P. consp. 20 3 (15.0)
12-Feb SEQ Slacks Creek P. alecto, P. polio. & P. scap. 20 1 (5.0)
12-Jun SEQ Slacks Creek P. alecto & P. polio. 13 1 (7.7)
Jul 09 to Jun 10 5-Aug SEQ Cedar Grove P. alecto & P. polio. 30 2 (6.7)
24-Aug FNQ Tolga Scrub P. consp. & P. scap. 30 2 (6.7)
25-Sep SEQ Cedar Grove P. alecto & P. polio. 36 12 (33.3)
2-Oct SEQ Cedar Grove P. alecto & P. polio. 45 2 (4.4)
9-Oct
1 SEQ Cedar Grove P. alecto & P. polio. 17 2 (11.8)
20-Oct
1 SEQ Cedar Grove P. alecto & P. polio. 32 4 (12.5)
22-Oct FNQ Lakeside P. consp. 35 2 (5.7)
25-Mar SEQ Cedar Grove P. alecto & P. scap. 34 1 (2.9)
Jul 10 to Jun 11 6-Jul FNQ Mareeba P. consp. 30 2 (6.7)
5-Jan SEQ Cedar Grove P. alecto 30 1 (3.3)
1-Feb SEQ Cedar Grove P. alecto & P. polio. 31 2 (6.5)
10-Feb
1 SEQ Cedar Grove P. alecto & P. polio. 32 1 (3.1)
24-Feb
1 SEQ Cedar Grove P. alecto & P. polio. 24 1 (4.2)
25-Mar
1 SEQ Cedar Grove P. alecto & P. polio. 28 1 (3.6)
12-May SEQ Cedar Grove P. alecto 20 2 (10.0)
28-May FNQ Lakeside P. consp. 30 2 (6.7)
3-Jun SEQ Tewantin P. alecto & P. polio. 13 1 (7.7)
1Five of the 20 sampling events yielding positive samples were ‘follow-up’ events prompted by previous detections. They are presented here for completeness, but
excluded from ‘prevalence’ analyses as these data are not independent.
2P. polio., P. consp. and P. scap. are abbreviations of Pteropus poliocephalus, P. conspicillatus and P. scapulatus respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028678.t001
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colonies ranging from tens to hundreds of thousands of individuals.
When they return to roost pre-dawn, they frequently urinate, and
the urine is readily caught on strategically placed plastic sheeting.
This approach greatly increased the number of animals sampled,
and thus the efficiency of sample collection. Secondly, influenced
by the success of Walcharaplusadee et al (2005) [5], we collected
and extracted from a large volume of urine, increasing the
likelihood of extracting RNA (or more RNA) if virus was present.
Thirdly, we screened for extracted RNA using a set of primers and
probe derived from the matrix protein gene of Hendra virus [6], as
this gene appears to be more highly conserved, hence this assay
was more likely to detect any Hendra virus variants. The approach
yielded the first ever identification of Hendra virus genome in the
urine of naturally infected free-living flying foxes, within the first
five months of the study.
We believe that our 1.5–6% minimum detectable prevalence
range, based on a typical 30 pooled urine samples from 10 sheets
(and representing 5–20 individuals per sheet) is conservative; that
is, we may sometimes be detecting infection present at lower
prevalence. To elaborate, the figure of 5 individuals per sheet
reflected the typical number of P. alecto, P. conspicillatus or P.
poliocephalus that (from our extensive observations) would roost
within a 3 m.62 m. perimeter (the dimensions of each sheet); the
figure of 20 individuals per sheet reflected the typical number of
the more densely roosting P. scapulatus that would roost within the
same perimeter. However the calculations do not consider the
often multiple vertical ‘layers’ of flying foxes above sheets that
could result in two or three times as many individuals over sheets,
significantly lowering the minimum prevalence detectable by 30
pooled samples.
The number of sampling events per annum over the three-year
study ranged from 16 to 32, the latter primarily reflecting an
increased effort on FNQ and NT samplings in the third year. In all
three years, the majority of the sampling events were in SEQ (14/
19, 14/16 and 19/32 respectively), due primarily to logistical
constraints to sampling in FNQ and NT. However, in the third
year, we were able to increase the number of FNQ and NT
samplings to reach our target sampling frequency (every 7–8
weeks) in these locations. We also sought to increase our sampling
efforts at all locations in January and February in the third year
(these months coincide with the peak of the wet season in
Queensland), and were successful in SEQ, but not in FNQ and
NT (because of an extended, and at times extreme, wet season in
2011). The number of SEQ samplings stayed relatively constant
(14, 14, 19) across the three years, reaching or exceeding our target
sampling frequency (every 4 weeks) for this location. The increased
number of SEQ sampling events in the third year reflected a
period of ‘follow-up’ sampling from January to early-April 2011, to
gather additional information on infection dynamics in a colony in
which infection was detected. A similar period of increased
sampling frequency also occurred August to October 2009 in the
same colony following detection of infection. Comparison of the
two periods reveals contrasting infection dynamics, with the 2009
period indicating an explosive outbreak (peaking with 33.3% of
urine samples positive), and the 2011 period suggesting a
smoldering infection (Table S1). While the data should not be
over-interpreted, these two dynamics are theoretically consistent
with contrasting levels of ‘herd immunity’ in the colony on these
two occasions, the former suggesting a high proportion of
susceptible individuals, the latter suggesting a low proportion of
susceptible individuals. Interestingly, Plowright et al (2011) [9]
concluded from modeling simulations that both explosive and
smoldering epidemics are necessary for the long-term persistence
of Hendra virus in nature.
The proportion of positive sampling events and the proportion
of positive samples provide two distinct measures of ‘prevalence’,
the former between sampling events, and the latter within
sampling events. We found that positive events were not
significantly associated with location or year, whereas positive
samples were. The wide 95% confidence intervals suggest the lack
of association with sampling event (given the trend suggested by
the point estimates) is primarily a reflection of the (statistically)
limited number of sampling events, rather than a true absence of
Table 2. The within-year distribution of 15 positive sampling events



















% (95% CI) positive
samples from positive
sampling events
Jan 1 1 100 (2.5–100) 30 1 3.3 (0.1–17.2)
Feb 5 2 40 (5.3–85.3) 51 3 5.8 (1.2–16.2)
Mar 7 1 14.3 (0.4–57.9) 34 1 2.9 (0.1–15.3)
Apr 8 0 0 (0–36.9) 0 0 0
May 3 2 66.7 (9.4–99.2) 50 4 8 (2.2–19.2)
Jun 5 2 40 (5.3–85.3) 26 2 7.7 (0.1–25.1)
Jul 6 1 16.7 (0.4–64.1) 30 2 6.7 (0.1–22.1)
Aug 5 2 40 (5.3–85.3) 60 4 6.7 (1.8–16.2)
Sep 5 1 20 (0.5–71.6) 36 12 33.3 (18.6–51.0)
Oct 5 2 40 (5.3–85.3) 80 4 5 (1.4–12.3)
Nov 5 1 20 (0.5–71.6) 20 3 15 (3.2–37.9)
Dec 4 0 0 (0–60.2) 0 0 0
1Five sampling events yielding positive samples (and three sampling events yielding negative samples) were ‘follow-up’ events prompted by previous detections, and
are excluded as these data are not independent.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028678.t002
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sampling event, sample size does not constrain statistical
confidence, and we see a strong association between positive
samples and both variables. Firstly considering location, we found
that the proportion of positive samples was similar in SEQ and
FNQ over the study period, and statistically different from NT,
where no samples were positive. The proportion of positive
sampling events showed the same pattern, but was not statistically
significantly different. This finding suggests a real difference in the
prevalence of Hendra virus infection in flying fox populations in
Queensland and the Northern Territory. Whether this difference
truly reflects location, or is confounded by species, population
structure or some other variable cannot be ascertained from our
study. Nonetheless, the finding of different infection prevalence in
flying fox populations in different locations (for whatever reason)
suggests a rationale for the (to date) geographic predominance of
Hendra spillover events in Queensland, when flying foxes and
horses exist in similar overlapping densities elsewhere in Australia.
Considering detections over time, we found that the proportion
of positive samples was significantly higher in year two than in
years one and three, indicating between-year variation in Hendra
virus infection prevalence in flying fox populations. This finding
fits well with the observed variable annual frequency of equine
cases of Hendra virus, and suggests that ecological, physiological
or other factors moderate infection or excretion in flying foxes.
We were interested to explore the ‘seasonal’ pattern of virus
excretion from flying foxes to compare and contrast with the
cumulative within-year occurrence of equine cases. When we
collapsed the three years of data into a single 12-month period, we
found positive sampling events in all months except April and
December, and while statistical confidence was lacking (again
evidently due to the modest number of sampling events), the over-
lapping 95% confidence intervals suggest detections can occur in
any month. To examine whether more detections might occur in
some months, we sought an association between the proportion of
positive samples and month. While the derived 95% confidence
interval for September suggests at least a partial association, the
collapsed September data actually represents a single positive
sampling event in 2009 in which 33.3% of samples were positive
(discussed above), thus this analysis should not be over-interpreted.
Our finding of positive sampling events throughout the year is
consistent with those of Walcharaplusadee et al (2005) [10] and
Epstein et al (2011) [11] in relation to Nipah virus detections in
flying foxes in Thailand and Bangladesh respectively. Significantly,
our findings indicate that flying foxes can be infected and excrete
virus at any time of year, and that the apparent clustering of
Hendra virus incidents in horses and associated humans (70% of
recognised incidents have been between June and October) reflects
factors other than the presence of virus. Identification of these
factors will strengthen risk minimization strategies for horses and
ultimately humans.
The detection of positive samples from single species roosts of P.
alecto and P. conspicillatus demonstrates that Hendra virus is
currently cycling in populations of these species. Where positive
samples were obtained from mixed species roosts, it was not
possible to conclusively attribute collected urine to a particular
species. Previous serologic surveys have found anti-Hendra virus
antibodies in all four species [3,4], but these findings do not
provide a robust insight into current infection status, nor to
whether some species are more ‘efficient’ natural hosts, in terms of
infection prevalence or excreted viral load. This subject warrants
further investigation, as it may provide an insight into the
‘Queensland-centric’ pattern of spillover events to date.
Our findings indicate that Hendra virus is not present in all
flying fox colonies all of the time, and that the level of excretion in
any particular colony fluctuates over time. In this study, 8.5% of
samples from positive sampling events were positive, with a range
of 3 to 33%, again indicating the dynamic nature of infection in
any particular colony. These figures may be an over-estimate of
the true population prevalence, given the possibility that multiple
positive (pooled) samples on individual sheets may reflect a single
individual. Paradoxically, while the data indicate that infection in
any given flying fox colony is evidently periodic and transient,
from a risk management perspective, it is appropriate to assume
that any colony could be infected at any time, and for horse-
owners, veterinarians and para-veterinarians to adopt recom-
mended exposure risk minimization strategies [12].
Screening populations rather than individuals, and seeking to
maximize the likelihood of detection at each step has been an
effective approach to investigating Hendra virus infection
dynamics in flying fox populations, and our study has yielded a
number of significant findings. Firstly, Hendra virus excretion
occurs periodically, rather than continuously, and in geographi-
cally disparate populations in Queensland. Secondly, the lack of
any detection in the Northern Territory suggests prevalence may
be higher in Queensland than elsewhere. A proposed expanded
comparative prevalence study between Queensland, the adjacent
state of New South Wales, and the Northern Territory aims to
clarify this. Additional years of data are needed in the current
study to improve the robustness of statistical comparisons within-
year and between-year, and a further three years are planned.
Finally, the finding that detections in flying foxes did not
temporally cluster with recorded spillover events to horses was
illuminating, and suggests a ‘necessary and sufficient cause’
paradigm for Hendra virus spillovers. That is, for spillover to
horses to occur, not only must virus be present, but also must one
or more ‘pre-disposing’ factors that increase the likelihood of
infection. Investigating such plausible host, agent or environmental
factors was beyond the scope of this study, and underlines the need
for on-going longitudinal studies.
Addendum
Since submission of the manuscript, the occurrence of an
unprecedented cluster of incidents in Queensland and News South
Wales (more than doubling the previously known number)
dramatically illustrates our finding of between-year variation in
virus excretion, and reinforces our key conclusions and recom-
mendations, particularly the ‘necessary and sufficient cause’
paradigm, and the proposed expanded research on infection and
transmission dynamics in Queensland and New South Wales.
Supporting Information
Table S1 Details of the total 67 sampling events yielding
1672 pooled urine samples from July 2008 to June 2011.
(DOC)
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